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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to examine 
two leverage ratios using a sample of non-financial 
companies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It 
was done by taking into account the joint effect of 
traditional capital structure determinants and managers’ 
personal values and aspirations. We applied hierarchical 
regression analysis to determine the contribution of 
profitability indicators, firm size indicators, assets, 
growth, networking, managerial strategies, managerial 
psychology, managerial human capital and earnings 
volatility to explain the variance in capital structure. 
The results suggest that companies with less experienced 
owners/managers and higher firm growth have higher 
financial leverage ratios. In the analysis of the balance 
sheet leverage, financial proxies of capital structure seem 
to be significant in explaining capital structure variance. 
Therefore, companies with lower profitability, a lower 
level of fixed assets and higher growth opportunities 
have higher balance sheet leverage ratios. The findings 
provide better understanding of theoretical perspectives 
that can best explain how companies choose their capital 
structure in the transition economy context. Furthermore, 
empirical findings should help corporate managers to 
make optimal capital structure decisions. 
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Introduction 
Although there is a universal consensus that financial theories have contributed to the 
understanding of capital structure decision-making, these financial theories disregard 
the role played by firm management in determining capital structure, especially for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), where managers exert a greater influence 
on the financing decisions compared to larger firms (Norton, 1991; Matthews et al., 
1994), as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Considering the significance of 
management influence in making financing decisions, management researchers have 
developed a variety of alternative theoretical frameworks based on diverse paradigms (as 
strategic management, psychology and sociology) to describe how financing decisions 
in SMEs are made (Barton and Matthews, 1989; Matthews et al., 1994; Romano et 
al., 2000; Ang et al., 2010; Hackbarth, 2008).
This group of different management-based theories required an overall theoretical 
framework until Van Auken’s (2005) launch of a model illustrating the dynamics of SMEs 
capital acquisition decisions, which recognized the primary determinants influencing 
the decisions on capital acquisition as being built on managerial characteristics and 
attitudes. This model incorporates a number of managerial factors which may affect 
the capital structure choice such as experience, risk preference, growth intentions 
and networking. Using the theoretical structure of Van Auken’s (2005), we identify 
managers’ influences on capital structure as consisting of managerial features (managerial 
network ties, education and experience) and attitudes (managerial aversion to external 
control, risk-taking propensity and growth intentions). Within this framework, we 
also consider firm-level characteristics such as size, profitability, asset structure, growth 
opportunity and earnings volatility, proposed by the conventional capital structure 
theories, to determine the extent to which managerial factors in conjunction with firm-
level characteristics influence the capital structure choice of SMEs.
The objective of this paper is to examine the importance of manager traits and attitudes 
in explaining the decisions made regarding capital structure in companies in developing 
economies/economies in transition, while using a sample of FBiHi enterprises.Our 
findings should provide deeper understanding of theoretical perspectives which best 
explain how companies choose their capital structure in the developing context. In 
particular, we contend that extending traditional capital structure theory to account 
for these managerial traits can decrease some important gaps between the known 
theoretical predictions and the unresolved empirical facts. In particular, financial 
executives in developing countries may hold different attitudes than their counterparts 
in developed countries. On the other hand, although there is some evidence (Booth et 
al., 2001) that developing countries have similar capital structures to those in developed 
countries, the firm variables have a relatively low effect on the structures. The reason 
for the poor cause and effect relationship may be due to institutional factors and 
management preferences. Therefore, this study brings together research on financial 
and strategic management, decision making, as well as social psychology in order to 
develop a conceptual model for understanding capital structure decision-making in 
privately held firms.
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Literature Review
Growth intentions and profit maximization are two managerial objectives that have 
gained the most attention in the literature with regards to their relationship to capital 
structure. Berggren et al. (2000) assert that decision-makers whose leading aim is 
business growth will tend to be less control averse and more active in searching for 
external sources of finance when internally originated funds are insufficient. Although 
limited empirical work has been conducted on how the manager’s intentions to 
maximize profit influence financing decisions, it is suspected that firms with intentions 
to maximize profits in the short-term will seek higher levels of short-term financing to 
take advantage of economic opportunities that present themselves. Such firms, however, 
should therefore be less reliant on long-term financing in their capital structure. Barton 
& Matthews (1989) and Matthews et al. (1994) were the first to emphasize that the risk 
propensity and control aversion of decision-makers may be significant determinants 
of capital structure in SMEs. The preceding empirical work performed on SMEs in 
Western economies validates that some managers prefer internal sources of funds, 
fearing that dependence on external sources of finance might lead to a loss of control 
over the firm and restrict the authority of owners to make decisions autonomously 
(Berger and Udell, 1998; Harvey & Evans, 1995; Hutchinson, 1995). In China and 
in many other emerging and developing economies, a weak institutional environment 
reinforces agency problems and leads to greater mistrust between managers and external 
capital providers (Young et al., 2008). Barton and Matthews (1989) and Matthews 
et al. (1994) suggest that the risk-taking propensity of SME manager will influence 
the debt level they are willing to adopt. In general, managers with risk perception 
bias believe their company is less risky than it actually is and therefore less likely to 
experience financial distress. Because of a weak institutional environment, risk-taking 
propensity might be expected to have an even bigger influence on the financing choices 
of SMEs in emerging and developing economies. 
Human capital may affect the capital structure of SMEs in a number of ways. The 
value of a manager’s human capital, defined here as the knowledge and diverse skills of 
the SMEs managers (Hatch and Dyer, 2004), depends on the firm’s business strategy. 
Some studies suggest that human capital is positively linked to the use of debt in 
SMEs (Bates, 1990; Zhang, 2008) while others find no or a negative relationship 
(Scherr et al., 1993; Romano et al., 2000; Cassar, 2004). For example, Scherr et al., 
(1993) observe a negative and statistically significant relationship between the age, 
managerial experience and education level of the manager and the use of debt in the 
capital structures of SMEs. However, research conducted by Zhang in 2008 on the 
sample of SMEs in China showed that companies whose managers are more highly 
educated are more likely to rely on formal debt financing. This positive relationship 
could be attributed to the fact that managers holding college degrees and/or graduate 
degrees are assumed to have the additional knowledge required for better decision-
making and consequently may be more competent than managers without those 
degrees. Additionally, their educational background might be an indication to outside 
investors about the firm’s human capital quality and influence the creditor’s willingness 
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to approve the loan. As far as managers’ experience is concerned, experienced managers 
should have the capability to better perform risk assessment (Ozgen and Baron, 2007). 
The owner’s/manager’s background and experience are assets that contribute to the 
decision-making regarding access to resources – including financial resources - and 
consequently signal the competitive advantage of that company (Schutjens and Wever, 
2005). It is important to note that the human capital immanent in the manager’s 
prior experience plays a more important role in decreasing the asymmetric information 
between the firm and external investors in developing economies than is the case in 
developed economies. Generally, research studies performed in developed economies 
show a negative relationship or no relationship between the age of the manager and 
the company’s reliance on external financial sources (Scherr et al., 1994; Romano et al., 
2000). Scherr et al. (1994) offer the possible reasons for such findings: the unwillingness 
of financiers to lend to older people because of shorter anticipated time of their 
ownership, the fact that older owners/managers are more risk averse in comparison to 
those younger, but also having in mind that older owners/managers are wealthier than 
the younger ones, which allows them to use more of their personal wealth to finance 
their business operations. Applications for bank loans are also influenced by the social 
capital, i.e. the actual and potential resources reachable through an actor’s network 
of relationships (NahapietandGhosal, 1998). Because of the lack of publicly-available 
data on SMEs, financiers often depend on their informal contacts with managers at 
other firms to assess the creditworthiness of a loan applicant and the feasibility of 
their business proposals (Nguyen et al., 2006). In this study, we use Wu’s and Leung’s 
(2005), definition of network ties. Despite a growing amount of work on the role 
played by network ties in the financing behavior of firms, limited work has examined 
how network ties might influence the capital structure of companies.  
Empirical Framework
This study is an attempt to give a comprehensive and robust analysis of the determinants 
of the capital structure of FBiH firms. The conceptualization of corporate structure 
choice employed in this research adds firm-level characteristics proposed by traditional 
financing theories to the managerial factors influencing the capital structure choice, 
to propose and test a new theoretical model (Figure 1). Using Van Auken’s (2005) 
structure, we identify manager influences on capital structure as consisting of 
managerial characteristics (managerial network ties, education and experience) and 
attitudes (managerial aversion to external control, risk-taking propensity and growth 
intentions). We seek to determine the extent to which each of the proposed factors 
influences the capital structure of FBiH companies, when pooled together. The 
research results will provide the following information: (1) To what extent the existing 
capital structure theories from the finance paradigm can adequately explain the 
financial behavior of firms in the developing economy context? (2) To what extent the 
managerial strategy, psychology, human capital and network ties influence the capital 
structure of firms in FBiH?
How Micro-Level Determinants Affect the Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
185Volume 5   Number 2   Fall 2015
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Capital Structure Choice
Capital 
structure
Manager’s 
level 
determinants
Manager’s characteristics Managerial strategy
Managerial psychology
Manager’s attitudes Managerial human 
capital
Network ties
Firm’s level 
determinants
Firm size
Profitability
Growth opportunity
Asset tangibility
Risk
Source: Framework proposed by authors
The main research hypothesis of the study is as follows:
•	 Personal characteristics and attitudes (latent factors: managerial strategy, managerial 
psychology, managerial human capital and network ties) coupled with traditional 
capital structure determinants (latent factors: assets, firm’s size, asset tangibility, 
and growth opportunities with earnings volatility as the observed variable) are 
determinants of the capital structure.
Based on the literature review provided above, assumptions about the influence 
of managerial characteristics on capital can be articulated through the following 
hypotheses: 1) the  growth  intentions  of  the  manager  are  positively correlated to 
leverage, 2) the intention of the manager to maximize profit is positively correlated to 
leverage, 3) the aversion to external control of the manager is negatively correlated to 
leverage, 4) the manager’s risk-taking propensity is positively correlated to leverage, 
5) the educational level of the manager is positively correlated to leverage, 6) the 
managerial experience of the manager is positively correlated to leverage, 7) the age of 
the manager is negatively correlated to leverage and 8) manager’s personal network ties 
with other companies, government officers and banks will be positively correlated to 
the leverage. 
Data Collection and Sampling
The variables we use for the analysis are taken partly from financial statements and 
partly from a survey. While surveys have limitations (e.g., non- respondent bias), at 
least they give a window into executive thinking on capital structure. They try to find 
the hidden motivation behind the financing choice and have the advantage that they 
can question difficult to measure and complex factors. 
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Due to the financial statements data availability, this study will focus on one entity, 
the Federation of BiH (FBiH). We used the AFIP (Agency for the Financial, IT 
and Intermediary Services) dataset for the 2012 that maintains a comprehensive 
financial database of all companies operating in the FBiH, containing 19,446 firm-
year observations. The AFIP database is made available for commercial use by “Tron 
Systems”. This database contains the balance sheets and income statements of all 
companies obliged to submit their reports to the AFIP, under the law. After collecting 
the data, but before running the main data analyses, we performed a dataset screening 
process for ungrouped data (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2013). After initial screening, our 
dataset contained a total of 18,393 firm-year observations, where the limited liability 
company is the dominant legal form of organization accounting for over 97.5% of the 
sample analyzed in the observed year. Having in mind that fact, owners will be very 
often also the managers of their companies.
The focus of our empirical enquiry/study is capital structure decision of joint stock 
(JSC) as limited liability companies (Ltd), stratified by 16 different industries. In 
order to better understand the characteristics of the homogenous subsets (Albright, 
Winston, and Zappe, 2006), we had to exclude a certain number of enterprises from the 
population data. In particular, we eliminated the companies legally organized as neither 
JSC nor Ltd. Furthermore, banks, financial companies, and insurance companies were 
also removed from the sample because of their specific financial structure. Investment 
companies were neither included, because their income mainly results from the value 
of their holding portfolios. This value depends on the financial structure and business 
conditions of the firms whose stocks are included in the portfolio rather than the 
financial structure of the investment companies. This restriction is necessary because 
banks, as well as insurance and investment companies are subject to rigorous regulations 
concerning their capital structure and financing decisions and are additionally severely 
affected by exogenous factors (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Additionally, out of the entire sample of companies present in 2012, a random selection 
of 450 companies among different industries was made in order to apply an online 
questionnaire ensuring additional data on managerial psychology, managerial strategies, 
managerial, human capital and network ties. The questionnaire was distributed to the 
sample of enterprises from the dataset used in the first research stage, selected from the 
sampling frame using: (i) random number tables and (ii) random number generator, 
such as Research Randomizer (2008). This sampling technique was possible as the 
sampling frame was vast enough. We applied a questionnaire used in past research 
on firm financing decisions, including Van Auken (2005) and Carter and Van Auken 
(2005). The respondents were asked to identify characteristics of their firms, ownership 
structure, number of employees and the size of market served. The  second  section 
asked  respondents  to  rank  perceptions  (1=strongly  disagree  to 5=strongly agree) 
of 25 issues related to network resources, business objectives and external financing. 
In the third section, we asked them questions about the personal characteristics of the 
managing director. Pretesting was conducted in order to test for clarity, after which the 
questionnaire was slightly revised. The main changes were made to the formulation of 
questions.
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We received 242 questionnaires that satisfied the recommended sample size gained via 
sample power analysis performed using G*Power 3.1.7. of 205. But the response ratio 
of 53.78% cannot be ignored, and we needed to check whether there was a presence 
of non-response bias. We applied the Mann – Whitney U test to see whether there was 
a statistically significant difference between the values  of variables from the financial 
statements of companies that participated in the survey and companies that did not. 
Out of the 15 variables from financial statements used in further analysis only two 
variablesii showed a significant difference between the companies who responded and 
the companies that did not respond to the survey. Furthermore, we followed up by 
conducting another mini survey with the sample selected randomly from the non-
respondents (those who did not participate in the actual survey). However, the follow-
up survey was done using a different method of soliciting and data collection, to ensure 
that differences observed were not due to the survey method’s effects. We conducted 
telephone interviews with 15 non-respondents asking them to complete the survey 
over the phone. When this was done, the researchers compared the responses between 
the respondents and the non-respondents on the key variables from the survey. We 
found no differences and therefore, we believe that the responses to our survey are 
non-response biased.
Results and Discussion
Since the main research objective in this paper is to assess contribution of underlying 
manager’s personal characteristics and attitudes with traditional capital structure 
determinants in explaining the firm’s capital structure choices, we have employed 
standard and hierarchical regression analysis.
Leverage was measured by two variables (Welch, 2011): the financial-debt-to-capital 
ratio (financial leverage) that does not consider non-financial liabilities as debt [PCS1], 
and the total-liabilities-to assets ratio (balance sheet leverage) that treats financial 
and non-financial liabilities alike [PCS2]. Empirical capital structure research also 
faces another key question, which is whether to use book leverage or market leverage 
(book registered debt is divided by the sum of the registered debt plus the equity 
market value). We do not have that choice simply because we do not have the data on 
market values. The normality of distribution of almost all variables is violated before 
the data are transformed using natural logarithm. Only variables related to company 
size, balance-sheet leverage (total liabilities to assets ratio) and the age of the general 
manager meet the assumption of normality. Regression models are developed for each 
leverage dependent variable respectively.
The paper proposes capital structure determinants listed in Table 1. In order to run 
regression analysis with determinants that are having significant correlation with 
capital structure indicators, correlation between capital structure and determinants are 
presented. 
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Table 1. Correlation between Determinants and Capital Structure
Determinant Code r Financial 
Leverage
r Bal-
ance-Sheet 
Leverage
Natural logarithm of total assets [FSA] .054 -.112
Natural logarithm of total revenues [FSR] .021 -.123
Natural logarithm of employees num-
ber 
[FSE] .069 -.122
The ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes and depreciation to total assets 
[PP1] .072 -.084
The ratio of net income to the total 
assets 
[PP2] -.029 -.136*
The ratio of tangible fixed assets to the 
total assets 
[PA1] .023 -.167*
The ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets 
[PA2] .051 -.021
The ratio of inventories to total assets [PA3] .161* .144*
The ratio of receivables to total assets [PA4] -.054 -.006
The ratio of difference in the book 
value of total asset between yeart-1 and 
yeart divided by the book value of the 
total assets in yeart-1
[PG1]
.010 -.065
The ratio of difference in total reve-
nues between yeart-1 and yeart divided 
by total revenues in yeart-1
[PG2]
.083 .070
Regression of book value over the total 
assets over ten years on a time trend ; 
coefficient of the trend, scaled by the 
book value of the total assets, as proxy 
for growth 
[PG3]
.164* .198**
Growth intensions [PMS1] .094 -.004
Profit maximization intensions [PMS2] .069 .045
Control aversion [PMP1] -.071 -.067
Risk propensity [PMP2] .026 .035
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Age of the manager [MHC1] -.057 -.127
Experience of the manager [MHC2] -.142* -.135*
Educational level of the manager [MHC3] -.070 -.141*
Networking with other firms [PN1] .067 .044
Networking with Government officials [PN2] .073 .047
Networking with Banks [PN3] -.066 -.104
Earning Volatility [PE] -.072 -.076
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Analysis of correlations between proposed determinants and capital structure indicators 
shows that statistically significant correlations with financial leverage have the ratios of 
inventories to total assets [PA3], regression of book value [PG3] and experience of the 
manager [MHC2]. Companies with higher financial leverage have less experienced 
manager and with higher ratio of inventories to total assets and higher regression of 
book value as proxy of growth.
Balance-sheet leverage has statistically significant correlations with the ratio of net 
income to the total assets [PP2], the ratio of tangible fixed assets to the total assets 
[PA1], the ratio of inventories to total assets [PA3], the regression of book value [PG3], 
the experience of the manager [MHC2] and educational level of the manager [MHC3]. 
Companies with higher balance-sheet leverage have less ratio of net income and fixed 
assets to the total assets, higher ratio of inventories to total assets, higher regression of 
book value, less experienced manager and lower educational level of the owner and 
manager.
All statistically significant correlations between proposed determinants and capital 
structure indicators are low (below .20). Total contribution of determinants explaining 
capital structure will be calculated using linear regression model including only 
determinants with statistically significant correlations. The model for financial leverage 
will differ from model for balance sheet leverage considering that balance sheet leverage 
has more determinants with statistically significant correlations.
Regression model with determinants of financial leverage
Independent variables in the model are:
•	 [PA3]The ratio of inventories to total assets 
•	 [PG3] Regression of book value of the total assets over ten years on a time trend; 
coefficient of the trend, scaled by the book value of the total assets 
•	 [MHC2] Experience of the manager
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The ratio of inventories to total assets, regression of book value and experience of the 
manager explains about 6% of variance of financial leverage. Explained variance is 
statistically significant (F=6.093; P=0.001) and differs from expected random guess. 
Even though the model has statistically significant prediction, predictive power is 
rather low.
Table 2. Model Summary for Financial Leverage
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
1 .274a .075 .063 .2759008
The collinearity statistics parameters indicate that there are no issues with 
multicollinearity among independentt variables (all VIF lower than 2). The ratio of 
inventories to total assets and regression book of value have significant contribution 
to explanation of financial leverage variance while experience of the manager does not 
have significant contribution (chances for random contribution are over 5% but less 
than 6%).
Table 3. Coefficients for Financial Leverage
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t
Sig.
Collinearity
Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1
(Constant) .388 .064 6.110 .000
PA3 .174 .064 .175 2.716 .007 .986 1.014
PG3 .176 .064 .176 2.736 .007 .984 1.016
MHC2 -.132 .068 -.125 -1.948 .053 .995 1.005
Before concluding on significant determinants of financial leverage we run hierarchical 
regression analysis with first block of independent variables being set to the ratio of 
inventories to the total assets and regression book of values while in second block all 
other determinants (from Table 1). In such case (amended regression model) experience 
of the manager and both profitability indicators (the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes and depreciation to total assets and the ratio of net income to the total assets) 
have additional contribution to financial leverage variance. Hierarchical regression 
model is rerun with experience and profitability determinants being in the second 
block of independent variables.
Adding second block of determinants improve predictions by 3.1% (adjusted R square) 
that is statistically significant.
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Table 4. Amended Model Summary for Financial Leverage
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change Statistics
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .244a .059 .051 .2775929 .059 7.155 2 227 .001
2 .337b .113 .094 .2713040 .054 4.549 3 224 .004
The ratio of inventories to the total assets, regression book of values, experience of the 
manager, the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets and 
the ratio of net income to the total assets are all significantly contributing to explanation 
of financial leverage variance. Higher financial leverage have companies with higher 
ratio of inventories to the total assets, higher regression book of values, higher ratio of 
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets, lower experience of the 
manager and lower ratio of net income to the total assets.
Table 5. Amended Model for Financial Leverage Coefficients
Model
B
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t
Sig.
Tolerance
Collinearity 
Statistics
Std. 
Error Beta VIF
1
(Constant) .315 .052 6.108 .000
PA3 .180 .064 .181 2.792 .006 .988 1.012
PG3 .184 .065 .184 2.841 .005 .988 1.012
2
(Constant) .406 .066 6.164 .000
PA3 .175 .063 .176 2.785 .006 .986 1.014
PG3 .189 .068 .189 2.783 .006 .855 1.169
MHC2 -.147 .067 -.139 -2.186 .030 .985 1.015
PP1 .325 .117 .327 2.787 .006 .287 3.480
PP2 -.360 .117 -.362 -3.086 .002 .288 3.472
Third set of independent variables are entered in the regression analysis to check for 
possible additional contribution of remaining variables from original model, however 
none of them had additional statistically significant contribution to explanation of 
financial leverage variance.
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Among independent variables that are having significant contribution explaining 
financial leverage significant positive correlations are between profitability indicators 
(the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets and the ratio 
of net income to the total assets), and between regression book of values and both 
profitability indicators. Correlation between profitability indicators is quite high (over 
0.80) while correlations between regression book of values and profitability indicators 
are smaller (app. 0.35).
Table 6. Pearson Correlation between Independet Variables with Significant Predictive 
Validity of Financial Leverage
PA3 PG3 MHC2 PP1 PP2
PA3 1 -.109 -.040 -.045 -.039
PG3 -.109 1 -.056 .345** .349**
MHC2 -.040 -.056 1 .058 .012
PP1 -.045 .345** .058 1 .841**
PP2 -.039 .349** .012 .841** 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Regression model with determinants of balance-sheet leverage
Independent variables in the model are:
•	 [PP2]The ratio of net income to the total assets  
•	 [PA1]The ratio of tangible fixed assets to the total assets  
•	 [PA3] The ratio of inventories to total assets 
•	 [PG3] Regression of book value of the total assets over ten years on a time trend; 
coefficient of the trend, scaled by the book value of the total assets 
•	 [MHC2] Experience of the manager 
•	 [MHC3]Educational level of the manager  
Independent variables explain about 13.5% of variance of balance-sheet leverage. 
Explained variance is statistically significant (F=6.970; P=0.000) and differs from 
expected random guess. Predictive power for balance sheet leverage is about 7.5% 
higher than for the finance leverage.
Table 7. Model Summary for Balance-sheet Leverage
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .397a .158 .135 .27656
The collinearity statistics parameters indicate that there are no issues with 
multicollinearity among independent variables (all VIF lower than 2). The ratio of net 
income to the total assets, the ratio of tangible fixed assets to the total assets, the ratio 
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of inventories to total assets and regression book of value have significant contribution 
to explanation of balance-sheetleverage variance while experience of the managerand 
the education level of the managerdo not have significant contribution.
Table 8. Coefficients for Balance-sheet Leverage
Model
B
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t
Sig.
Collinearity 
Statistics
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1
(Constant) .673 .084 7.975 .000
PP2 -.238 .069 -.229 -3.460 .001 .860 1.163
PA1 -.145 .065 -.139 -2.214 .028 .952 1.050
PA3 .148 .065 .143 2.271 .024 .953 1.049
PG3 .282 .069 .270 4.066 .000 .855 1.169
MHC2 -.114 .068 -.103 -1.673 .096 .991 1.009
MHC3 -.113 .065 -.108 -1.746 .082 .981 1.020
Before concluding on significant determinants of balance-sheet leverage we run 
hierarchical regression analysis with first block of independent variables being set to the 
ratio of net income to the total assets, the ratio of tangible fixed assets to the total assets, 
the ratio of inventories to total assets and regression book of value while in second 
block all other determinants (from Table 1). In such case, (amended regression model) 
none of the independent variables have additional statistically significant contribution 
to explanation of balance-sheet variance. Adding second block of determinants does 
not improve predictions.
Higher balance-sheet leverage have companies with lower ratio of net income to the 
total assets, and lower ratio of tangible fixed assets to the total assets while having 
higher ratio of inventories to total assets and higher regression book of value. Revised 
regression model including only these four independent variables explains about 11.9% 
of balance-sheet variance (adjusted R square).
Among independent variables that are having significant contribution explaining 
balance-sheet leverage significant correlations are between profitability indicators (the 
ratio of net income to the total assets) and regression of book value, and between the 
ration of tangible fixed assets to the total assets and the ration of inventories to the total 
assets. While there is positive correlation between profitability indicator and growth 
indicators there is negative correlation between assets indicators.
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Table 9. Pearson Correlation between Independet Variables with Significant Predictive 
Validity of Balance-sheet Leverage
PP2 PA1 PA3 PG3 MHC2 MHC3
PP2 1 -.111 -.039 .349** .012 .091
PA1 -.111 1 -.162* -.100 .014 .015
PA3 -.039 -.162* 1 -.109 -.040 .046
PG3 .349** -.100 -.109 1 -.056 -.039
MHC2 .012 .014 -.040 -.056 1 .056
MHC3 .091 .015 .046 -.039 .056 1
The results in FBiH show a positive relationship between the firm’s capital structure 
choice and the firm’ growth opportunities. That is contrary to the findings of Titman 
and Wessels (1988), who concluded that growth has significant negative relationship 
with the capital structure. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the assets owned do 
affect capital structure and the results in FBiH indicate that the ratio of tangible assets 
to total assets has a negative relationship with the balance-sheet leverage. Some studies 
suggest that earnings volatility affects the capital structure; however, their results are 
inconsistent (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984). The results on the sample of FBiH 
companies show that the earnings volatility within the capital structure model defined 
in this paper does not significantly contribute to the overall prediction.
Newman (2010) investigated the determinants of the capital structure of companies in 
China. He confirmed that the firm size and age are positively related to leverage (short 
term, long term and total) and that there is no relationship between the asset structure 
and leverage He also found that profitability is negatively related to capital structure 
choice. The results for FBiH show that balance-sheet leverage is negatively related to the 
firm’ assets and profitability but positively related to the firm’ growth. The firm size in 
FBiH companies was not related to leverage as in China’s companies, while assets show 
negative relationship with leverage, which was not proven in the China’s case. Harris 
and Raviv (1991) summarized the results of several studies on capital structure. They 
found that leverage in general increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, growth 
opportunities and firm size and decreases with the volatility, advertising expenditures, 
research and development expenditures, bankruptcy probability, profitability and 
uniqueness. Some of their determinants are part of the capital structure model in this 
paper. We find that only higher growth opportunities relates to increased leverage, 
while the remaining relationships are not proved.
Several authors tested the capital structure structural equation model with contradicting 
results (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Their structural models in entirety prove to be 
weak, but the results on the relationships between growth and assets with leverage are 
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in line with our findings. The results further indicated that only one factor related to 
managerial-level variables influenced the capital structure of sampled firms. The human 
capital of owners/managers measured by their experience was found to be negatively 
related to the leverage of sampled firms. In particular, the data analysis revealed that 
firms run by a manager with a longer experience tended to have a lower financial leverage 
than those with less experienced owners/managers. This is in line with previous studies 
that found a negative influence of managerial experience on the leverage of SMEs 
(Scherr et al., 1993; Coleman andCohn, 2000; Cassar, 2004). Furthermore, these 
findings suggest that financiers place greater emphasis on the experience of owners/
managers when making lending decisions than on their educational background. They 
might also be partly explained by the fact that more experienced owners/managers tend 
to be more control averse than those with less experience. 
Conclusions
This study is an attempt to identify determinants of capital structure, and develop a 
plausible model that efficiently discriminates companies with a high and low leverage. 
The intention was to integrate classical financial theories of the capital structure and 
personal proxies’ theories in order to create a model that combines the companies’ 
characteristics with those of decision makers. Both firm and managerial level 
determinants can be divided into three groups: those which influence the willingness of 
decision makers to take on debt (risk propensity, control aversion, length of experience), 
those which influence the firm’s need for debt (profitability, manager’s growth/profit 
maximization intentions) and those which influence the ability of the firm to take 
on external debt (length of manager’s experience, managerial network ties, firm-level 
variables) (Newman, 2010). The study is based on two alternative leverage ratios, the 
financial leverage ratio and balance-sheet leverage ratio.  
The findings show that the financial leverage is significantly explained by two 
independent variables. One of them comes from the traditional financial proxies of 
capital structure and the other from new theories of personal traits. Companies with 
a less experienced manager and higher firm growth have a higher financial leverage 
ratio. Therefore, the level of financial leverage depends on the factors influencing the 
ability of the firm to access external debt, but also on the factors that influence the 
firm’s willingness to take on external debt. The collateral value of the assets, return-on-
assets (ROA) as a profitability indicator, and firm growth opportunities are statistically 
significant predictors of the balance sheet leverage. The financial proxies of capital 
structure seem to be significant in explaining the capital structure variance in analyzing 
the balance sheet leverage. Its level depends on the factors influencing the demand for 
external debt as well as the factors influencing the firm’s ability to access external debt. 
Therefore, companies with lower profitability, lower level of fixed assets and higher 
growth opportunities have higher balance sheet leverage ratios. The results prove that 
both financial proxies and personal traits are statistically significant predictors of the 
capital structure. 
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In other words, this suggests that certain commonly observed micro-leveldeterminants 
that are relevant for explaining capital structure in the developed economies are 
also relevant in the FBiH. This means that some of the insights from the modern 
finance theory are applicable to our country despite profound institutional differences 
that exist between the FBiH and those developed countries. Furthermore, based on 
the findings we could develop path models for prediction of financial and balance 
sheet leverage that will probably yield covariance matrices in line with the observed 
covariance matrices. Such proposed models are presented below.
Figure 2. Path Model for Financial and Balance-sheet Leverage
In order to verify the model they should be tested in a follow up study. However, 
explanatory power of the proposed model is expected to be low. We have found a 
difference between the results achieved when the leverage is defined by total liabilities 
instead of only financial debt. The determinants within the model related to the 
balance-sheet leverage can explain a higher percentage of capital structure variance 
(13.5%) than the determinants explaining the financial leverage (6%). Second, the 
achieved low explanatory power of leverage determinants is in line with previous 
studies in transition economies (Joeveer, 2006; Delcoure, 2007). They identified that 
a number of core determinants are able to explain only about 8% of the variation 
in leverage if the majority of firms in the sample are unlisted. For the listed firms, 
about 22% of the variation in leverage is explained by traditional determinants. Of 
course, the variation explained by traditional determinants in transition economies 
is lower than in developed economies. This is not surprising because the information 
asymmetryis higher and observable firm-specific characteristics are not fully reliable 
from a financial institution’ point of view.
Due to the complex number of forces that influence firm relations and managerial 
activity, capital structure decision is not simply a matter of deterministic, prescriptive 
principles, but it is, rather, an art, despite all the innovations in financial engineering 
and changes in the competitive context. It cannot be separated from the intellectual 
skill of “good” financial managers. Managerial behavioral factors therefore also provide 
ample opportunities for future research. 
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